TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

Building Back Stronger: A Strategic Model for Post-Supply Chain Attack Management

Shatakshi Singh[a], Shruti Trivedi [b] and Rinku Raheja [c]
[a] Research Scholar, National PG College, Lucknow, U.P., India
[b] Research Scholar, National PG College, Lucknow, U.P., India
[c] Assistant Professor, National PG College, Lucknow, U.P., India,
Shata.singh077@gmail.com, strivedi1201@gmail.com, rr_141085@yahoo.co.in

KEYWORD

Supply Chain Attack; Recovery Model; Supply Chain Cases; Third Party

ABSTRACT

In today's fast-paced, interconnected world, supply chains are essential to the smooth operation of any business. Yet, with this increased connectivity comes a hidden risk: vulnerabilities that cybercriminals are all too eager to exploit. Supply chain attacks, where attackers target the very systems and networks that companies rely on, have become more common, leading to disruptions, loss of sensitive data, and significant financial strain. These attacks are not only growing in frequency, but they are also becoming increasingly sophisticated, making it clear that prevention alone is no longer enough. Companies need a plan for what comes next – a way to recover quickly and learn from the experience. This paper delves into the growing threat of supply chain attacks and introduces a post-recovery model designed to help businesses manage the aftermath. By focusing on rapid recovery, strengthening security, and fostering long-term resilience, this model enables businesses to recover effectively and emerge more prepared for future challenges. In a world where things can change in an instant, it's not just about preventing an attack – it's about knowing how to recover and emerge even stronger when the unexpected happens.

1. Introduction

Supply Chain Attack, also known as "island-hopping" attack, which is most sophisticated and difficult-to-detect attack, in this attack hackers target the weakest link within the supply chain of a software or product, any software or product have various interconnected network of individuals, organisations, resources, activities and technology involved in the development and delivery of a software product or service, thus, to handle these different component an organisation often rely on external entities to manage parts of their supply chain, however, if these links (external organizations) have weak security systems—such as unencrypted resources or exploitable vulnerabilities—they provide an open door for attackers to breach sensitive data.

Corresponding Author: Shatakshi Singh, National Post Graduate College
Email: shata.singh077@gmail.com

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

According to reports, it is reported that 1 supply chain attack happens every 48 hours with India being most targeted country along with USA, UK, Australia, Japan and Germany [1]. In 2024, approximately 1,83,000 customers worldwide were affected by supply chain attack and threats circulating via open-source repositories has surged by 1300% between 2020 and 2023[1]. The rising trend in attacks from **2019 to 2024** underscores the escalating risks. By **2025**, it is predicted that **45% of organizations worldwide** will experience attacks on their software supply chains, with an associated cost of **$60 billion** [2].



Figure-1 : Supply Chain Attack Trend From Year 2019-2024[19]

Supply chain attack is responsible for having various severe impact on an organisation such as:

•Financial Losses (62%)
•Sensitive data loss (59%)
•Reputational Damage (57%)
•Operational Impact (55%)

Figure-2: Impact of Supply Chain Attack on and organisation

Despite the devastating consequences, many organizations fail to take adequate preventive measures. Studies reveal that **74% of supply chain attacks** originate because organizations were either unaware of risks or failed to monitor them proactively before the breach [3]. Once a breach occurs, recovery timelines vary significantly:

- **51% of organizations** manage to recover within a week.
- Over **40%** take a month or longer to restore operations fully [3].

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

The complexity of an organization's supply chain, coupled with the severity of the attack, plays a critical role in determining the speed of recovery. However, many organizations tend to prioritize short-term solutions, such as restoring lost data, while overlooking the systemic vulnerabilities that led to the breach. To ensure long-term resilience and effectively mitigate future risks, a more comprehensive recovery strategy is not just beneficial—it is essential [4].

Therefore, our Post-Recovery Model proposes a comprehensive **five-phase approach** that enables organizations to prioritize rapid recovery while also drawing attention to addressing internal vulnerabilities that could leave systems exposed to future exploitation.

2. Case Study

2.1. SolarWinds Cyber Attack:

In December 2020, SolarWinds experienced a software supply chain attack that is widely regarded as one of the most sophisticated and far-reaching cyberattacks in history. Hackers, believed to be a Russian espionage group, infiltrated SolarWinds' software development process and inserted a backdoor—later named **SUNBURST**—into the company's Orion platform. This breach compromised approximately **18,000 organizations worldwide**, including prominent U.S. government agencies and private companies [6][7].

The attack was executed by modifying the Orion platform plug-in, **SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll**, which is distributed as part of the Orion platform updates. The hackers injected malicious code into this plug-in, enabling them to distribute the backdoor to SolarWinds customers. Once installed, the SUNBURST malware granted attackers access to sensitive information across affected systems.

The attackers maintained unauthorized access to SolarWinds' network for an extended period of about **14 months**. The timeline of the breach reveals the attackers' methodical approach:

- **September 2019**: Hackers gained unauthorized access to SolarWinds' network.
- **October 2019**: Malicious code injection began within the Orion platform.
- **February 2020**: The SUNBURST backdoor was successfully embedded into the Orion platform.
- **March 2020**: SolarWinds began distributing compromised Orion software updates to its customers [8].

The breach remained undetected until **December 2020**, when cybersecurity firm **FireEye** identified the compromise during its own investigation into an unrelated incident. Following the detection, SolarWind took immediate action by immediately isolating the Orion software for preventing further spread of Sunburst malware, analyze and access the impact of the malware, proving the software update to customer through which the vulnerabilities and Sunburst malware can be removed, communicating with affected parties and applying long-term security improvement.

2.2. ASUS Live Update Attack

ASUS, the **5th-largest PC vendor company**, provides the **ASUS Live Update Software**, a utility pre-installed on most ASUS computers. This software is designed to automatically

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

update critical components such as **BIOS, UEFI, drivers, and applications**, ensuring systems remain up-to-date and secure.

However, in a sophisticated supply chain attack, hackers exploited this feature by **faking legitimate updates** using a stolen digital certificate, which ASUS used to sign authentic binaries. The attackers tampered with an older version of the ASUS Live Update software, injecting malicious code into it. These compromised updates were then hosted on the official ASUS update servers, making them appear legitimate and evading detection by security systems [10].

The compromised updates were distributed to approximately **1 million devices globally**, but the attackers demonstrated remarkable precision, targeting only around **600 specific devices** using hardcoded MAC addresses [11]. This selective targeting allowed the attackers to remain undetected for an extended period while focusing on high-value targets.

The breach was eventually discovered in **March 2019** by cybersecurity firm **Kaspersky**, which detected the malicious activity during routine checks. Kaspersky promptly informed ASUS about the attack, leading the company to take appropriate actions to mitigate the impact. ASUS released a clean version of the Live Update utility and implemented measures to strengthen its software development pipeline and distribution process.

2.3. Kaseya VSA Supply Chain Ransomware Attack

On July 2, 2021, the REvil ransomware group exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Kaseya's Virtual System Administrator (VSA) software, a tool used by Managed Service Providers (MSPs) to manage client networks. Despite being informed of the vulnerability by the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD) weeks before, Kaseya was in the process of releasing a patch when the attack occurred over the U.S. Independence Day weekend, maximizing the impact due to reduced IT staff. The attackers used a variety of techniques, including authentication bypass and DLL sideloading, to compromise VSA servers and distribute malicious payloads to downstream client systems [12][13].

Although fewer than 60 direct clients of Kaseya were affected, these clients managed systems for around 1,500 businesses, including Sweden's Coop, which had to close 800 stores. The attackers initially demanded $70 million in ransom, but many organizations restored their systems using backups. Kaseya eventually obtained a universal decryption key and provided it to customers free of charge by July 21, 2021 [14].

This attack highlights the vulnerability of centralized IT management tools and the cascading risks posed by supply chain attacks. Key takeaways include the importance of timely patching, strong access controls, and the segmentation of client environments to mitigate such risks. Monitoring for advanced tactics, such as the use of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBin), is critical in defending against sophisticated ransomware groups like REvil [12][13][14].

2.4. Moveit supply chain attack

The MOVEit file transfer software faced a significant supply chain attack in 2023 due to an SQL injection vulnerability [15]. The breach affected over 130 organizations, including British Airways, the BBC, Zellis, and the Minnesota Department of Education, exposing

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

sensitive data such as personally identifying information (PII) like names, addresses, and Social Security numbers [16].

Cl0p, a Russian-speaking cybercrime syndicate, exploited the zero-day vulnerability, infecting servers with malware and exfiltrating data from MOVEit databases [16]. The gang had been testing the vulnerability since July 2021 before launching the attack on May 27, 2023 [17]. The SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362) allowed unauthorized database access, with the Cl0p ransomware gang targeting both private and public networks [18].

The widespread breach, referred to as a "hydra-headed breach," impacted thousands of organizations worldwide. High-profile victims included British Airways, the BBC, Shell, Ernst & Young, and the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles, among others [17; 18]. By late October 2023, the breach had reportedly affected 2,559 organizations and over 66 million individuals globally [16].

Progress Software, MOVEit's developer, was first alerted on May 28, 2023, and issued a public warning on May 31, 2023 [18]. The vulnerability was quickly patched, but further reviews identified five more zero-day vulnerabilities, all addressed by July 6, 2023 [16]. Despite these efforts, the scale of the attack and its impacts were significant, with ongoing remediation and legal battles. Total estimated costs could reach $12.15 billion [16].

3. The Post-Recovery Model:

The proposed post-supply chain attack model is more than just a response plan—it's a blueprint for resilience in the face of disruption. In an age where supply chain attacks can ripple across industries, paralyzing operations and eroding trust, this model provides a structured, proactive approach to recovery and fortification. It’s not just about reacting to a crisis; it’s about transforming vulnerabilities into opportunities for growth and improvement.

This model guides organizations through critical phases, from real-time detection and isolation of affected components to transparent communication and recovery. It ensures that no stone is left unturned—vendors are scrutinized, attack paths are analyzed, and operations are rebuilt stronger than before. Each phase is interconnected, creating a seamless process that minimizes impact and accelerates recovery while fostering trust among stakeholders. Incorporating this model into organizational practices isn’t just a necessity—it’s a strategic advantage. By addressing immediate threats and embedding continuous improvement, it equips businesses to navigate a complex and ever-evolving threat landscape with confidence and agility. The following phases highlight the critical actions that lead to a stronger, more resilient supply chain:

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577



Figure-3: Post-Recovery Model

3.1 Detection Phase:

The **Detection Phase** in our Post-Recovery Model serves as the first line of defence, enabling organizations to identify and isolate threats before they escalate. According to a study conducted by IBM on 477 companies, it was found that organizations took an average of **197 days** to identify a data breach, with a mean time of **69 days** [18]. This delay provides hackers with ample time to dwell within a company's codebase, embedding backdoors and stealing sensitive user data. Therefore, the ability to detect a security breach early is crucial for minimizing damage and expediting recovery.

In the context of supply chain attacks, where threats often go undetected for extended periods, the Detection Phase becomes the foundation of an effective recovery model. The earlier a threat is identified, the easier it becomes to recover from the attack, while also minimizing the resources that hackers can exploit. The importance of early detection is evident from the cases of **SolarWinds** and **Kaseya**.

As discussed earlier, in the case of **Kaseya**, the organization was aware of the vulnerability and was in the process of addressing it when the attackers exploited it to deploy ransomware. On the other hand, in the **SolarWinds attack**, it took **9 months** for the breach to be identified, during which hackers had already installed backdoors and were actively exploiting the system. These cases highlight the critical need for close monitoring of systems to reduce dwell time and prevent extensive damage.

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

We would suggest following steps to be taken by an organisation for early detection of the attack:

- *Regularly Monitor Network Activities:* Analyze network traffic for unusual spikes or unauthorized access. Tools such as Wireshark or Splunk can help investigate anomalies and flag suspicious behavior.
- *Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):* Strengthen access controls by requiring multiple layers of verification. As demonstrated in the SolarWinds case, weak passwords were a key entry point. MFA can significantly reduce risks associated with compromised credentials.
- *Encrypt Critical Cryptographic Keys and Certificates:* Ensure all sensitive cryptographic keys and digital certificates are securely encrypted. In the ASUS Live Update breach, stolen certificates were used to distribute malicious updates. Encrypting and regularly rotating keys can prevent such exploitation.
- *Track Login Activities and Codebase Changes*: Continuously monitor login attempts and audit changes in the codebase. In the SolarWinds case, early monitoring of login activities could have helped terminate unauthorized access sooner.
- *Use Real-Time Alerting Systems*: Deploy real-time alerting systems to notify security teams of unusual activities, such as unauthorized file changes or abnormal login patterns. AI-driven tools like Darktrace or Vectra AI can enhance detection accuracy and reduce false positives.

By proactively monitoring systems, securing critical assets, and implementing advanced detection tools, organizations can significantly reduce the dwell time of attackers and minimize the potential damage. The lessons from high-profile attacks like SolarWinds, Kaseya, and ASUS emphasize the necessity of robust detection mechanisms. A strong detection strategy not only supports rapid recovery but also builds long-term resilience against future threats, safeguarding an organization's reputation and operations.

3.2 Containment Phase:

Once a threat is detected during the Detection Phase, the Containment Phase ensures that the threat is isolated and neutralized before it can escalate. The Containment Phase focuses on isolating affected systems, neutralizing the attack, and ensuring that the damage does not propagate to other parts of the organization's infrastructure.

While containing the software, following steps can be taken:

- *Isolate of compromised systems*: All the server, devices or network should be disconnected. Immediately isolating the software can prevent it from further contaminating other resources.
- *Analyse and identify the scope of breach*: A quick analysis should be done to identify what system or component has been compromised, how many customers are affected as well analyzing what were the vulnerability which was exploited by the attackers.
- Blocking any unrecognized or unknown IP addresses, domains or ports.

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

It should also be noted that, disconnecting critical systems may disrupt operations therefore backups and network segmentation can be used for smooth running of the business operation.

By effectively containing the threat, organizations can limit the scope of damage and create a controlled environment for subsequent eradication and recovery efforts. This ensures a faster return to normalcy while protecting critical assets.

3.3 Third-Party Risk Management:

Following the Detection and Containment phases, the **Third-Party Risk Management** step is crucial for addressing vulnerabilities that can arise from external vendors and suppliers. In our increasingly interconnected world, organizations often rely on third-party services for operations, software, and supply chain functions. While these partnerships are essential, they also present a potential entry point for attackers. A breach at one of these third-party vendors can trigger a ripple effect, compromising an organization's own infrastructure and data.

The importance of managing third-party risk is highlighted by high-profile breaches like **SolarWinds**, **Kaseya**, and **3CX**. In the **SolarWinds** attack, the attackers infiltrated the company's software updates, which were distributed to thousands of customers, including government agencies. This allowed them to access sensitive information across various organizations. Similarly, **Kaseya** was compromised through vulnerabilities in its VSA software, affecting over 1,500 businesses. The **3CX** breach demonstrated how supply chain attacks can exploit vendor relationships to distribute malware. These incidents underscore the need for businesses to carefully assess and monitor their third-party vendors to prevent cascading effects on their own security.

To manage third-party risks effectively, organizations must adopt key strategies and follow industry standards to protect sensitive data. These include:

- *Vendor Vetting*: Vendor vetting is essential for reducing third-party risks by evaluating a vendor's security practices, compliance certifications, and incident history. Industry standards like ISO 27001, SOC 2, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework are crucial benchmarks. The SolarWinds breach emphasized the importance of thorough vetting, highlighting the need for organizations to ensure vendors follow best practices to mitigate risks of data breaches and service disruptions.
- *Secure Communication*: Secure communication is vital for protecting sensitive data exchanged with third parties. Using encryption protocols like SSL/TLS and secure file-sharing methods such as SFTP helps protect data during transmission. Adhering to standards like ISO 27018 and NIST SP 800-52 ensures compliance with best practices. The Kaseya breach demonstrated the consequences of weak communication security, stressing the need for robust protocols to prevent data interception and tampering.

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

- *Audit and Monitoring*: Ongoing auditing and monitoring of third-party activities are crucial for ensuring compliance with security agreements and identifying potential threats early. The 3CX incident highlighted the importance of proactive oversight to detect vulnerabilities, manage risks, and prevent unauthorized data access. Real-time monitoring helps organizations respond swiftly to breaches, minimizing system damage.

- *Employee Training***:** Training employees to recognize phishing and other common attack methods is essential in reducing third-party risks. Regular training on identifying suspicious activities and unauthorized communications helps mitigate the risk of security breaches. By fostering awareness at all levels, organizations can significantly reduce the likelihood of breaches and strengthen their overall security posture.

Managing third-party risk is not a one-time task but an ongoing process that requires continuous evaluation and oversight of vendor relationships to ensure they meet the organization's security standards.

3.4 Post-Incident Analysis:

Post-incident analysis is a critical component of any effective security model. It involves examining the breach in depth, understanding how and why it occurred, and taking steps to ensure that similar incidents are prevented in the future. This phase goes beyond just addressing the immediate damage—it is about learning from the incident to enhance security protocols and strengthen defenses.

Key steps in this analysis include identifying all affected systems, data, and processes to understand the full scope of the breach. Tracing the attack path helps uncover how the attackers gained access and exploited vulnerabilities. Root cause analysis then focuses on pinpointing weaknesses, such as outdated software or gaps in monitoring practices, that enabled the breach. Addressing these vulnerabilities is essential for reinforcing the organization's security posture.

For example, the SolarWinds attack revealed significant flaws in the security of the supply chain, prompting widespread efforts to improve vendor vetting and monitoring practices across industries. Additionally, post-incident documentation—detailing the timeline of events, technical findings, and lessons learned—serves as a valuable resource for improving policies and preparing for future threats.

Effectively addressing the breach and preventing future incidents involves the following key steps after the post-incident analysis:

- *Identify All Affected Areas*: The first step is to map out all systems, processes, and data impacted by the breach. This helps determine the full scope of the incident and prioritize recovery efforts. By identifying affected areas, organizations can ensure no vulnerabilities are overlooked and focus on remediating critical systems. For instance, after the Equifax breach, identifying the exposed personal data was crucial for notifying affected customers and securing the data.

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

- *Assess the Attack Path*: Understanding how attackers infiltrated the system is essential for preventing future breaches. This involves examining how the attackers gained access, such as through phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, or weak security controls. By identifying the attack path, organizations can address the specific weaknesses in their defenses. In the case of the SolarWinds attack, attackers exploited a vulnerability in the Orion software, which gave them access to multiple organizations.

- *Root Cause Analysis*: Root cause analysis focuses on identifying the weaknesses that allowed the breach to occur. This could include misconfigurations, inadequate monitoring, or outdated software. Addressing these underlying issues ensures better protection in the future. For example, the Target breach was caused by compromised vendor credentials, highlighting the need for robust vendor security management.
- *Incident Documentation*: Detailed documentation is vital for transparency and future learning. This includes recording the timeline, impact, and corrective actions taken. Proper documentation also helps in regulatory compliance and improves response strategies. The British Airways breach in 2018 resulted in comprehensive incident documentation, which outlined the impact and response measures taken, and played a role in the subsequent regulatory fines.

Overall, post-incident analysis is vital for continuous improvement. It ensures that lessons are learned from past breaches, enabling organizations to proactively address risks, recover quickly, and prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.

3.5 Communication and Transparency:

This step in post-supply chain attack recovery is critical for several reasons. When a supply chain attack occurs, multiple stakeholders, such as clients, vendors, partners, and regulatory bodies, are often impacted. Clear and timely communication helps these stakeholders understand the situation, reducing confusion and preventing misinformation from spreading.

This step is especially important in restoring stakeholder trust. If an organization is transparent about the scope of the attack, the immediate actions being taken, and long-term recovery plans, stakeholders are more likely to feel confident that the organization is actively working to resolve the issue. Without transparency, stakeholders may speculate about the severity of the attack, which can lead to panic, loss of confidence, and reputational damage.

For example, during the **SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack (2020)**, the company was initially criticized for delayed communication but later provided regular updates about the breach and recovery actions, which helped rebuild trust. Similarly, **Kaseya (2021)** communicated openly with clients, providing guidance and working with cybersecurity firms to restore services, which helped mitigate reputational damage.

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

However, some cases lacked proper communication. The **Equifax Data Breach (2017)** saw significant delays in notifying the public, leading to widespread criticism and a loss of trust. Similarly, **Target (2013)** delayed informing customers about a breach, which caused confusion and damaged their reputation. These cases emphasize the importance of timely, transparent communication to manage recovery, maintain trust, and comply with regulatory requirements. Failing to communicate effectively can lead to greater damage and longer recovery times.

The Communication and Transparency step involves several key actions to ensure effective recovery after a supply chain attack:

4 *Clear Communication with Stakeholders*: It is essential to notify affected parties promptly, offering detailed and actionable information about the attack's impact and the steps being taken to recover. This includes informing customers, vendors, and partners about what has happened, how it affects them, and what measures are being implemented to mitigate the impact. Clear communication helps minimize confusion and reduces the risk of misinformation.

5 *Transparency*: Sharing regular updates on mitigation measures and outlining the strategies for future recovery and prevention is crucial for rebuilding stakeholder trust. This transparency ensures that everyone involved understands the efforts being made to fix the issue, prevent future incidents, and restore operations. Keeping stakeholders informed at every stage helps to maintain confidence in the organization's ability to handle the situation.

6 *Regulatory Compliance*: If the supply chain attack involves sensitive data or other regulated information, it is vital to report the incident to the appropriate regulatory bodies. Compliance with data protection laws, such as GDPR or CCPA, ensures that the organization meets legal obligations and avoids potential fines or legal consequences. Timely and accurate reporting to regulators also demonstrates accountability and commitment to transparency.

7 *Regulatory Reporting*: Depending on the nature of the attack, organizations may need to adhere to specific industry standards or legal requirements for reporting data breaches or incidents. This includes notifying affected individuals, providing detailed breach reports, and collaborating with law enforcement or regulatory bodies as necessary. Fulfilling these reporting obligations helps mitigate reputational damage and shows that the organization is addressing the breach in line with industry norms.

3.6 Recovery and Improvement:

The **Recovery and Improvement** phase is a vital turning point in the aftermath of a supply chain attack. It goes beyond simply recovering from the immediate impact; it is about transforming the disruption into an opportunity for future growth and resilience. This phase focuses on rebuilding not just what was lost,

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

but strengthening the entire security framework, improving operational protocols, and enhancing supply chain processes to ensure that future threats are met with stronger defenses. By addressing the damaged products, reinforcing security measures, and embracing continuous improvement, organizations can emerge more adaptable, secure, and capable of handling future challenges. This phase ensures that businesses don't just recover—they evolve, learning from past mistakes and reinforcing weaknesses, ensuring they are better prepared for an ever-evolving threat landscape. It's about using each experience to build a more secure and efficient foundation for the future.

1. *Fix and Replace Affected Products***:** In the aftermath of a supply chain attack, quickly fixing and replacing compromised products is essential to limit further damage. This step goes beyond simply restoring what was lost; it ensures that new products meet higher standards of security and quality, preventing future vulnerabilities. It's an opportunity to reassess and improve product quality, ensuring that every replacement adds value and trust to the recovery process.

2. *Strengthen Security:* A supply chain attack doesn't just expose weaknesses; it uncovers vulnerabilities in an organization's entire digital ecosystem. Once the dust settles, it's time to shift from recovery to strengthening your defenses. Securing your digital environment isn't just about patching up the holes—it's about building a fortified, adaptive security framework. **Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)** ensures that no one and nothing is trusted by default, continually validating every user, device, and application. **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)** adds a tough second line of defense, making unauthorized access nearly impossible. Meanwhile, **data encryption** locks down sensitive information, and **patch management** ensures systems stay ahead of potential threats. Finally, **Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)** serve as vigilant sentries, identifying digital threats in real time. With these measures in place, organizations aren't just recovering—they're evolving into unbreachable digital fortresses, primed to withstand and outpace future cyber challenges.

3. *Continuous Improvement:* Recovery isn't a one-time fix—it's an ongoing process. Continuous improvement means learning from the breach, refining operational processes, and fostering a culture of vigilance. By updating security protocols, enhancing employee training, and adopting new technologies, businesses become more agile and resilient. Each lesson learned strengthens the organization's ability to face future challenges, ensuring that it's always evolving to stay one step ahead.

4. Conclusion

Supply chain attacks are an undeniable reality in today's interconnected world, but this paper demonstrates how organizations can turn these threats into opportunities for lasting growth and enhanced resilience. While no system can offer complete immunity against all risks, the recovery model outlined here serves as a powerful framework for addressing immediate damage and fortifying defenses against future attacks. However, it's crucial to

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

acknowledge that the cyber threat landscape is constantly evolving, and no strategy is without its limitations. The real strength lies in an organization's ability to continuously adapt, learn from each breach, and proactively improve its security posture. By doing so, businesses can transform vulnerabilities into opportunities for innovation and secure a competitive edge. Ultimately, the road to resilience is ongoing, and those who remain vigilant, agile, and committed to strengthening their systems will not just survive—but emerge stronger, more adaptable, and better prepared for whatever challenges lie ahead.

References:

[1]. Kratikal, "Why Supply chain attacks are the biggest threat to business", Kratikal. https://kratikal.com/blog/why-supply-chain-attacks-are-the-biggest-threat-to-businesses/
[2]. CyberCrime Magazine, "Software Supply Chain Attacks to Cost the world $60 billion by 2025", Steve Morgan, Oct 3,2023. https://cybersecurityventures.com/software-supply-chain-attacks-to-cost-the-world-60-billion-by25/#:~:text=Gartner%20predicts%20that%20by%202025,Guy%20Podjarny%2C%20founder%20of%20Snyk
[3]. BlackBerry Blog, "The State of Software Supply Chain Security[Research]", Bruce Sussman, Aug 6, 2024. https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/06/supply-chain-cybersecurity-survey-research#:~:text=Recovery%20After%20an%20Attack,of%20Product%20Security%20at%20BlackBerry
[4]. SupplyChain Digital, "Think Rebuild not recovery after a Supply Chain Attack", Tom Chapman, Oct 20, 2024. https://supplychaindigital.com/technology/immersive-labs-on-supply-chain-cyber-attacks
[5]. Zscaler, "What is the SolarWinds Cyberattack?", Zscaler. https://www.zscaler.com/resources/security-terms-glossary/what-is-the-solarwinds-cyberattack
[6]. Fortinet, "Solar Winds Cyber Attack", Fortinet. https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/solarwinds-cyber-attack
[7]. TechTarget, "SolarWinds hack explained: Everything you need to know", Saheed Oladimeji, Sean Michael Kerner,Nov 03, 2023.https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/SolarWinds-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know
[8]. CSO, "SolarWinds attack explained: And why it was so hard to detect", Lucian Constantin, Dec 15, 2020.https://www.csoonline.com/article/570191/solarwinds-supply-chain-attack-explained-why-organizations-were-not-prepared.html
[9]. Kaspersky, "Operation ShadowHammer: new supply chain attack threatens hundreds of thousands of users worldwide", March 26, 2019, Kaspersky. https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/operation-shadowhammer-new-supply-chain-attack
[10]. Shalini Lamba, Jatin Awasthi and Vikas Yadav, Beyond Cryptocurrency: Harnessing Blockchain for Cybersecurity, TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science ISSN-2583-5599 Vol.03, I.02 (2024)

TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science
ISSN-2583-5599
Vol.04, I.01 (2025)
https://www.tejasjournals.com/
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14932577

[11]. AttackIQ. 2021. "The Kaseya VSA REvil Ransomware Supply Chain Attack: How It Happened, How It Could Have Been Avoided." *AttackIQ*. https://www.attackiq.com/2021/07/13/the-kaseya-vsa-revil-ransomware-supply-chain-attack-how-it-happened-how-it-could-have-been-avoided/.

[12]. TrueSec. 2021. "Kaseya Supply Chain Attack Targeting MSPs to Deliver REvil Ransomware." *TrueSec*. https://www.truesec.com/hub/blog/kaseya-supply-chain-attack-targeting-msps-to-deliver-revil-ransomware.

[13]. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC). 2021. "Kaseya VSA Supply Chain Ransomware Attack." *U.S. Department of National Intelligence*. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/Kaseya%20VSA%20Supply%20Chain%20Ransomware%20Attack.pdf.

[14]. Proofpoint. 2023. "Supply Chain Attack." *Proofpoint*. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/supply-chain-attack.

[15]. Dimple Pappu Kumar Upadhyay Research scholar, Government Agreement Impact of Export-Growth Relationship in India Region, TEJAS Journal of Technologies and Humanitarian Science ISSN-2583-5599 Vol.03, I.01 (2024)

[16]. ORX. 2023. "MOVEit Transfer Data Breaches." *ORX*. https://orx.org/resource/moveit-transfer-data-breaches.

[17]. IT Governance USA. 2023. "MOVEit Breach: Over 1000 Organizations and 60 Million Individuals Affected." *IT Governance USA Blog*. https://www.itgovernanceusa.com/blog/moveit-breach-over-1000-organizations-and-60-million-individuals-affected.

[18]. Stripeolt. 2023. "MOVEit Supply Chain Attack." *Stripeolt*. https://stripeolt.com/insights/cyber-security/moveit-supply-chain-attack/.

[19]. IBM, “IBM Study: Hidden Costs of Data Breaches Increase Expenses for Businesses
a. ”, Larry Ponemon, July 11, 2018. https://newsroom.ibm.com/IBM-security?item=30567

[20]. Statista, “Annual number of customers impacted by supply chain attacks worldwide from 2019 to 2024”, Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1375129/supply-chain-attacks-customers-affected-global/